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Governments are in business in a big way. The Government of India produces and sells, among other things, steel, aluminium, copper, coal, petroleum, fertilizers, drugs, chemicals, power, electrical and mining machinery, television sets, watches, cars, machine tools, ships, computers, textiles, paper, newsprint, footwear and bread. It is also in the business of services in surface and air transport, tourism, banking, insurance and consulting. Most state governments are also in business in such areas as sugar, tyres, mining, electronics, transport, power, agriculture and forest produce.
Government businesses are set up mostly as companies under their ministries.. They are, however, subject to various government policies and bureaucratic control through rules and procedures, besides Parliamentary investigation and audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India.
The system as it works today has become a cause for concern. The financial returns on investments in non-oil government enterprises have been meagre. Most companies depend on the government for supply of funds for growth and for supporting their operating losses.
The burden on governments to finance their enterprises is mounting at a time when their current revenues are unable to meet current expenditures.
Government and Business Management
Decades of experience have raised serious doubts about public enterprises, especially in mixed economies with democratic systems of government. Governments that have a bias against being in business, such as the Margaret Thatcher government in Britain, have concluded that government management and business management are incompatible and that combining them is a design for enterprise inefficiency.
Governments under socialist compulsions admit the poor financial' performance of public enterprises, but continue their search for better ways of combining government ownership with more efficient management. A committee appointed by the Government of India in September 1984 under the chairmanship of Arjun Sengupta to review its policy for public enterprises was one such effort. The Committee noted that in spite of 30 years of phenomenal growth, the "overall performance of public enterprises had remained 'unsatisfactory, especially with regard to generation of resources and financial profitability." While suggesting changes in the "whole environment of operation" of public enterprises, the Committee concluded that certain forms of organization were more conducive to the efficient functioning of public enterprises than others. It suggested the holding company form of organization, especially for enterprises in the core sector, as a way to "reduce the points of intervention by the government in the management of the enterprises."
The Committee conceived the holding company as an intermediate level between the ministry and the companies, to ensure autonomy for public enterprises to take decisions on economic considerations while retaining their accountability to government on well-specified criteria of performance. The holding company was to act as a buffer between the day-to-day operations of the enterprise and the concerns and procedures of the government.
The Committee did not elaborate on what its concept of the holding company was or on the role of the government vis-a-vis the subsidiaries of the holding company. Nor did it provide an evaluation of the Indian experience with holding companies.
Our evaluation of the Indian experience with public sector holding companies shows that holding companies have been unable to insulate their subsidiaries from governmental interference. This conclusion is based on interviews with several current and past chairmen of holding companies, government officials in charge of public enterprises, and published data on the Indian experience with individual holding companies. We have drawn on the experience of holding companies in the private sector and contrasted them with that in 4 the public sector, especially the Institute for Reconstruction of Industry (IRI) of Italy.
Why a Holding Company?
The earliest suggestion of a form similar to the holding company was from the Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) in 1967. The Government of India then had 45 industrial and manufacturing enterprises, including 12 with private equity participation. The ARC suggested that the government should organize these businesses into 12 sector-corporations-one for iron and steel, another for coal and lignite, a third for petroleum and petrochemicals and so on, so that each corporation could concentrate on activities in a specific industry.
The ARC did not question the ability of the government to introduce public interest into the operations or its ability to manage enterprises on business lines. What ARC wanted the government to achieve through the holding company form was:
• not to fragment its industrial effort • to reduce its span of control • to confine its control of enterprises to strategic points.
The sector-corporations were to achieve economies of scale, provide staff services in research, training, consultancy, and sales promotion. Experience then with government management of enterprises was limited. The costs and constraints in government ownership and management of businesses were not fully understood. Although the government agreed that sectorcorporations might be advantageous, it did not implement this recommendation.
Why then does the holding company form continue to hold such attraction? Both the ARC and the Sengupta Committee assume that governments can manage businesses as large professional firms do, but informed by broader national economic objectives. Their recommendations appear to be based on trends in organizational innovation in large professional firms the world over. The view taken is that the government, the holding company and the subsidiaries can organize themselves as a multi-unit multi-level managerial hierarchy similar to those in the private sector. If so, it is important to know why such hierarchies have emerged in the private sector and how their Vikalpa corporate offices manage their operating units or subsidiaries.
In doing so, it is necessary to define what a holding company is. Legally, a holding company is any company which directly or indirectly controls the composition of the board of directors of another company-its subsidiary. For a legal view of the holding company see Box 1, alongside these columns.
Hierarchies in Private Sector
The origin of the multi-level hierarchy in the U S and its spread to Europe has been attributed to a better understanding of the mechanisms and instruments of mass marketing such as distribution and advertising, and the need to integrate them effectively with mass production (Chandler, 1962; Chandler & Daems, 1980) . Combining expensive marketing networks with lower unit costs on large volumes of production gave rise to the phenomenon. Whether organized functionally, geographically or product-division-wise, the multi-unit, multi-level hierarchy has gained competitive advantage over its simpler single-business rivals. The trend has been similar among some Indian private sector companies such as L and T and Hindustan Lever.
However, no neat formula exists as to how the top layers in these large private sector companies manage their subsidiaries or operating units. The multiple levels of management bring to bear on the unit, division, or subsidiary head a variety of influences, some even conflicting. The unit and higher levels of management share responsibility either routinely or specifically for any major action or decision. To add value, the top management levels have to get involved either before or after major decisions. If the degree of risk in an important decision so warrants, the various levels may reach either a negotiated or an implicit understanding of how the responsibility for consequences would be shared. As interdependence between the subsidiary and the higher levels increases, it is difficult to fix responsibility for operating results. This weakness threatens the maintenance of a credible basis for rewarding or curbing individual managerial careers. Performance is governed by the relationship between the managerial levels at the top and those of the operating units or subsidiaries. Mutual acceptability, trust and track records affect the quality of their relations. How the quality of these relationships Vol. 13, No. 3, July-September 1988 
Box l

What is a Holding Company?
Legally, a company is a holding company if it controls the composition of the board of directors of another company. Such control can be direct through ownership of the requisite equity of the subsidiary company or indirect as when specific clauses in the memorandum and articles of association of the subsidiary company provide for such control of the board of the subsidiary by the holding company, for considerations other than direct ownership of requisite equity. In law, the holding company, as a shareholder of the subsidiary company, enjoys the same privileges and rights as any other shareholder of the subsidiary company.
In the private sector, owners and managers use the holding company form for one or more of three reasons:
• minimizing tax and other statutory liabilities or risks
• increasing access to and control over funds, especially other than their own that are invested in the subsidiary companies
• integrating the subsidiaries into a network for common interests.
There have been criticisms of the holding company form. Private interests have abused it:
• to achieve high financial leverage
• to siphon out funds by inflating costs and prices
• for dubious inter-company transactions, including upstream loans.
Abuse of the holding company concept was common among power utilities in the U S before they were brought under regulation in 1935 (Irwin and Stanley, 1974) . Small shareholders were critical of the managing agency system in India, a kind of holding company, for abuse of the concept before the managing agency system was brought under regulation in 1956 and finally abolished in 1970. Abuse of the trust of the small shareholder or evasion of tax are not a monopoly of the holding company. They can be practised with any form of organization. But a holding company is particularly useful when managements want to raise the costs of tracking inter-company transactions, if not make them intractable.
The legal approach, therefore, is to restore to the shareholders of the holding company their rights in the subsidiaries. The approach is to provide them with-critical information to help track down intercompany transactions. The law, therefore, requires the holding company to show in its annual report the audited balance sheet and profit and loss accounts of all its subsidiaries. Members of the holding company can apply for governmental investigation of the affairs of the subsidiary, as if they alone were members of the subsidiary.
Private and Public Sector Holding Companies
The Companies Act, however, makes no distinction between a public sector and a private sector holding company. The spirit of the law is, in fact, to prevent the holding company from acting as a buffer between the shareholder's of the holding company and its subsidiaries. The government, as the major shareholder of the holding company, therefore, has a legal right to authorize its representatives to inspect the books of accounts or seek an investigation into the affairs of the subsidiaries, apart from controlling the composition of the boards of directors of the subsidiaries through 'its holding company.
Relevance to Public Sector
The legal view gives government, the owners' surrogate, the rights of owner, irrespective of the form of organization. It is for the government to decide what form of organization is suited to its planning and control needs, as owners' surrogate and manager, and how it wants to use its rights in the subsidiary.
Of the three reasons for a private sector holding company given, the first, namely minimizing tax liability, is not relevant from the national economic point of view. The second, namely, increasing access to private funds is also not very relevant. The third reason, namely, integrating the subsidiaries into a network for common national economic interests, such as improving efficiency or effectiveness of holding company's businesses, carries a significant and continuing appeal.
Of the eight styles they identified, they found that the two styles at two extreme ends of the planning and control continuum had been abandoned. One was where both planning and control influences were weak. This style called for the centre's intervention only when the subsidiary was continuously non-performing. This style provided for too little influence for the centre to add value to the units. The other extreme was where planning was centralized along with tight financial and non-financial control. This style centralized too much power at the top to draw the best out of the subsidiaries. Are these experiences of the private sector relevant to the public sector holding companies?
Public Sector Holding Company
In the public sector, 'the ability of the holding company to add value to the subsidiaries is complicated by government ownership, management and control. Various departments or ministries of the government exercise fragmented and uncoordinated control over various aspects of enterprise viz. appointments,' finance, wage and labour policies, or investment outlays. As a result, instead of operating as a multi-level single hierarchy, the government operates on the enterprise as a set of multiple hierarchies. This is' Vikalpa because the role of the government as owner and its role as manager of the enterprise are not distinguished clearly and adequately.
Before creating the public sector holding company, therefore, the responsibilities of various government departments or ministries have to be unified within the government. The unified governmental responsibility as owner must be separated from its responsibility for planning and control of on-going business enterprises. Further, the unified governmental responsibilities have to be organized such as to give concrete shape to public purpose in terms of results expected and the allocation of the associated costs between the government and the holding companyespecially those costs that are non-commercial in nature. This political responsibility has to be consciously separated from managerial responsibilities because the two operate differently over different time horizons and with different ways of reconciling the disparities in goals and means. Viewed in this perspective, the holding company is the organizational buffer to integrate the two sets of responsibilities. Such integration can be effective only when the owners are clear and specific about their interests as well as about who will bear the costs of achieving them. Only then the government as the owner of public enterprises can entrust the holding company with the task of integrating its social objectives with operational efficiency and the holding company can devise its own methods for planning and controlling the subsidiaries, keeping the above purpose in view.
The case of IRI, which is briefly described in Box 2 alongside these columns, illustrates this important point about the public sector holding company. The Indian experience shows that in public sector holding companies not only was there no separate mechanism for giving concrete shape to the owners' interests but that the way the centre or the top functioned in the hierarchy corresponded to the two extreme styles of planning and control identified above as dysfunctional.
Styles of Indian Public Sector Holding Companies
Several public enterprises of the Government of India have subsidiaries of their own. Some companies have created subsidiaries technically to Vol. 13, No. 3, July-September 1988 Box 2
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The Institute for Reconstruction of Industry, or IRI, is a widely known state holding company under the Ministry State Holdings of Italy. IRI controls hundreds of diverse state-owned companies. The structure of IRI was designed to let the subsidiaries retain the character of private enterprise while enabling the political authorities to influence the holding company for public ends. The companies in which IRI has majority or minority shareholding are engaged in production activities and services ranging from steel, aircraft, shipbuilding, electronics, telecommunications and food and confectionery sectors to banking and broadcasting. IRI is legally required to operate on economic viability criteria.
The government control of IRI is exercised through:
• two permanent inter-ministerial committees of ministers-one for economic planning (CIPE) and the other for industrial Policy (CIPI The Committees are not to intervene in technical and economic matters or the means for achieving the objectives they set. Directives to be issued by the Committees to the Ministry of State Holdings are arrived at after the differences among ministers are reconciled. Vacillation in the committees is possible but is restricted to major policy directives or project initiatives and not to on-going operations or routine matters.
The task of the Minister of State Holdings is not to manage the state holding companies and their subsidiaries but to nominate the members of the boards of the holding companies. He has to ensure that holding companies follow the legal statutes.
formalize an associated function or input. For example, HMT Ltd. is strictly a holding company as it has a subsidiary for its international operations called HMT International Ltd. Similarly, the Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India Ltd. (MMTC) has a subsidiary called the Mica Trading Corporation of India Ltd. for exporting mica. Although HMT and MMTC are legally holding companies, they were not intended to buffer government enterprise relations. The following seven, however, were set up with this purpose in view.
• Hindustan Steel Ltd. The last two are less than two years old. It may be too early to assess the experience. But have the first five been effective as buffers? A brief look at each of them may provide a clue to answering this question.
Hindustan Steel Ltd.
Hindustan Steel Ltd. (HSL) was a holding company set up in 1957 to coordinate the production, distribution, procurement, training and personnel for the three integrated steel plants located in Bhilai, Durgapur, and Rourkela as well as the Alloy Steel Plant in Durgapur. HSL was to reduce the burden of coordination of the Ministry of Steel and Mines and to be a professional layer of management between the ministry and the plants.
However, HSL, in practice, became an information and advisory agency for the ministry. All decisions on production coordination were taken by the Joint Plant Committee (JPC) and those with regard to distribution--pricing and allocation of steel -were taken by the Iron and Steel Controller (ISC). The JPC and ISC operated directly under the Ministry. The general managers of the plants were appointed by the government and each plant produced its own balance sheet and profit and loss account. HSL put them together. Interministerial problems and investment decisions for the plants were handled by the government directly, leaving for HSL the housekeeping work alone:
Appointments
The full-time chairman and part-time vice-chairman of IRI are appointed for three-year terms, renewable no more than twice, by the President of Italy based on the nomination by the Minister of State Holdings with the advice of the Cabinet and a Joint Standing Committee of Parliament. Of the 12 part-time members of the board, nine are senior civil servants and three are outside experts. The outside experts are appointed for three-year terms, extendable without limit, by the Minister of State Holdings (Marsan, 1986) .
The chairman, vice-chairman and the three expert directors form the Executive Committee to which the board delegates most decisions. The Committee met 53 times in 1982 while the board held 12 meetings. A key statutory position is that of the permanent general manager, appointed by the Minister of State Holdings from among the senior executives of IRI. Over the last 35 years there were only six chairmen and as many general managers, giving IRI considerable continuity.
The relation between the minister and the board of the holding company is of a confiding, not of a hierarchical nature (Maniatis, 1966) . For financial and other synergies, IRI hands over its shareholding in operating companies in a sector, such as telecommunications, to a sectoral subholding company. IRI appoints boards of directors of the sectoral subholding company and operating companies according to the guidelines issued by its own board.
Auditors
The Minister of State Holdings appoints the fivemember Board of Auditors to ensure that audit and accounting practices and systems followed by IRI are sound. On behalf of the state, a magistrate from the State Court of Accounts attends all the meetings of the Board, the Executive Committee and the Board of Auditors to ensure that IRI is following the decision-making rules correctly, especially those related to the burdens of a political origin imposed on IRI and fully compensated by the Treasury. The State Court of Accounts' findings are included in a yearly report presented to Parliament. The Court calls attention of political authorities on any deviation from the decision-making rules that prevent a meaningful assessment of managerial performance.
Financing
Government financing is limited to the provision of endowment funds which earn no dividends. These funds are provided as compensation to IRI for meeting specified non-commercial or social ends. IRI has to seek such funds with respect to specific invest-HSL itself was uncertain of its role. In the first 12 years, it had six chairmen and changed the location of its headquarters five times. After nine years, the Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings noted that the functions of its board, the chairman and the plant managers were not clearly defined. Consequently, HSL could not become a hierarchical part of the planning and control function of the centre. It had so marginal a role in practice that it was left practically undisturbed which the Steel Authority of India Ltd. was established in 1973 as a holding company for HSL and its steel plants.
State Trading Corporation of India Ltd.
The State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. (STC) was not conceived as a holding -company when it was set up in 1956. The STC Review Committee (1968) under the chairmanship of Mr. P L Tandon, the chairman-designate of the company, proposed the form of a holding company for it. The proposal was patterned after the multi-unit multi-level hierarchy in the private sector to suit STC's trading in a variety of commodities. Although the proposal was not accepted as a concept, government allowed the creation of subsidiaries as strong individuals with unique orientations pressed for autonomous roles. Subsidiaries were set upHandloom and Handicrafts Export Corporation (HHEC) with Pupul Jayakar as chairman, and the Indian Motion Picture Export Corporation (IM-PEC) with A M Tariq as chairman. STC, as a holding company, could not influence the direction or planning and control of these subsidiaries. Government dealt with them directly. The subsidiaries, too, did not feel that the holding company added any significant value to their operations. Even for administrative or other expertise, they did not depend on the STC; they could secure it through their own full-time employees who were transferred to the subsidiary or through informal consultations with their erstwhile colleagues in the holding company.
STC operated with multiple hierarchies. It had a very small role to play in the appointments of chairmen or directors of the boards of the subsidiaries. These officials were appointed by the ministry, sometimes against the wishes of the chairman of the holding company. The chairmen of HHEC and IMPEC were not members of the board of STC. Business relationships between the holding company and the subsidiaries were minimal, except for preparation of accounts 'and loss Vol. 13, No. 3, July-September 1988 ment projects. Once granted, IRI is free to deploy the endowment funds as it sees fit. The only condition imposed on IRI is that it should distribute 65 per cent of its profits to the State. This condition is only a technicality inasmuch as endowment funds have accounted for less than 10 per cent of IRI's total capital investments in the last two decades, and IRI's profit record is not such as to make dividend an important consideration.
Market borrowings are IRI's major source of funds. The proportion of private equity in the capital invested in the subsidiaries in the industrial section was less than four per cent in 1982. Because of a low equity base and high Italian interest rates, IRI had to bear higher finance charges than its European competitors.
Pricing
In market sectors such as steel or electronics, IRI has to price its products and services competitively. In the regulated sectors, such as telephone services, the adjustment of prices has lagged inflationary trends, to suit the counter-inflationary policies of the government.
Relations with Parliament
Parliament scrutinizes IRI based on the information supplied by:
• subsidization. The holding company thus never became an effective instrument to dovetail the public purpose behind its establishment with the missions, roles, and activities of the subsidiaries. The subsidiaries as well as the government could easily dispense with the holding company to achieve this objective.
The relationship between STC and its other subsidiaries, namely, the Projects and Equipment Corporation Ltd. or the Cashew Corporation of India Ltd., were closer to parent-subsidiary relationship in the private sector but this was chiefly due to the initiative of the individual chief executives. At the initial stages, the holding company and these two subsidiaries maintained a communication-cum-supportive relationship through inter-linked boards, common services, reviews, cadres, and autonomy. However, these relationships did not last long and now the holding company plays a very small role as a buffer between the government and the subsidiaries. Ministrysubsidiary relationship is the same as for any fully autonomous public enterprise. As a holding company, thus, the STC has been reduced to a mere formality-nothing more than a legal or accounting technicality. As a senior official of STC put it: "In public enterprise, there is more emphasis on form than substance. Elaborate routines and procedures are followed but essential controls are missing. We don't even know what is happening in our own branches, let alone the subsidiaries. No one has the courage to take responsibility for decisions."
Steel Authority of India Ltd.
In contrast to STC, as a holding company, the Steel Authority of India Ltd. (SAIL), set up in 1973, had the mandate to be a buffer between the public enterprise and the government. It was an experiment of Mohan Kumaramangalam, Minister for Steel and Mines, to change the culture of government, the bureaucratic overlay on business operations.
It was expected that SAIL would handle business matters in a business-like manner replacing the bureaucratic method of the Department of Steel. Until its holding company role was abandoned in 1977, SAIL did act as an entrepreneur on behalf of the state. It appointed the chairman and the members of the boards of the subsidiaries. It was the agent of the government and public sector financial institutions with respect to the private enterprises in the steel industry. The chairman of SAIL was the Secretary to the Government of India in the Department of Steel. He was the chief adviser to the Minister of Steel on all questions, eliminating the bureaucratic process that delayed decisions and added little to their quality. The chairman of SAIL had financial powers several times more than in the case heads of other enterprises. However, the enhanced powers were low in comparison with large investments needed in the steel industry, so that recourse to government approvals were often necessary. Nevertheless, SAIL could activate timely approvals or take timely decisions on its own. In many respects, it replaced the Department of Steel as an important planning and control layer in the multi-level hierarchy vis-a-vis the units or subsidiaries. It was able to buffer day-to-day activities of the enterprises from governmental methods.
During the three-and-a-half years of its operation as a holding company, SAIL under Wadud Khan's chairmanship was also able to produce results. Annual production of saleable steel during the three-year period from 1973 to 1976 averaged 3.154 million tonnes, up nearly 15 per cent over the average in the preceding three years. Close and constant liaison with power suppliers and railways (through inter-ministerial meetings) was established and swift internal action at managerial, supervisory and worker levels were taken.
Unlike HSL, SAIL exercised control over production coordination and distribution. The measure of plant performance was changed from ingot steel to saleable steel with a view to increasing customer responsiveness. Indenting was simplified and allocation speeded up. The company introduced a dual pricing policy, ensuring lower prices for government needs, in the place of a cheap steel policy. HSL, as part of SAIL, made a net profit of Rs 48 crore in 1974-75 compared to a loss of Rs 45 crore in 1971-72.
The control Wadud Khan exercised, however, brought resistance not only from within but also from outside SAIL. He was personally attacked in Parliament as on oil-shampoo-cosmetics manager, and not a steel manager-a caustic reference to his erstwhile association with the Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. He was described as a "czar," "mughul." In the political system, where power was centralized with the Prime Minister, Wadud Khan lasted only as long as he had powerful political support. "Once I knew that the Prime Minister was no longer with me, I quit," was how Wadud Khan summed up the reasons for his quitting. And with his departure, SAIL as a holding company also ceased to exist.
National Textile Corporation Ltd.
National Textile Corporation Ltd. (NTC) came into being as a holding company after the nationalization in 1974 of 103 private textile mills. NTC has nine regional subsidiaries, each holding several units in the region. It accounts for 30 per cent of the capacity in the organized sector and employs nearly 200,000.
NTC appears ideally suited for operating as a multi-unit multi-level hierarchy. Its assets and markets are spread all over the country. The units need modernization. The overlaps in the equipment and product mix of various units need rationalization in the face of scarce resources, severe competition and the unique tastes and preferences of consumers in each region.
Has NTC been effective as a buffer between the government and the subsidiaries? The chairman of NTC summed up the functioning of NTC as a holding company for the Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings (1981-82) as follows: "I have been chairman of one of the largest holding companies, then Steel Authority of India Ltd. and I think, if I may speak frankly, this (NTC) is just a holding company in name. There are ten companies. One is the holding company and the others are subsidiaries."
On the planning and control function of NTC one former chief executive had the following to say:
"The areas of coordination were not clearly defined. The problem is that if the holding company acts as the overall supreme body it tends to interfere too much in the operations. The egos of the chairman and board members of the subsidiary are hurt. Problems arise. There is a tussle between the subsidiary and the holding company as to the framework and what the holding company should do." "On the other hand, if the holding company does not or cannot act to plan and control the operations of the subsidiaries, it will become ineffective. Subsidiaries will go in their own way. This can happen either because the chairman of the holding company is personally not on top of the situation or because the government does not back the holding company's initiatives." "There was little selectivity in modernization, because the problem was not viewed for the company as a whole. The government split-up the limited resources available mill-wise and spread too thinly. Government was interested in doing something for each mill. The holding company played very little role in allocating resources." "Similarly, the chairman of the holding company could not even transfer general managers among subsidiaries, let alone appoint the chairmen and directors of the subsidiaries." "In some areas, the holding company was compelled to interfere on behalf of government guidelines even though they run counter to business or productivity needs. We negotiated with a subsidiary and its unions for levels of productivity comparable to those of the private sector in the region in terms of employee ratios and hours of work. However, we had to insist on adherence to the Bureau of Public Enterprise guidelines on bonuses that were much lower than what comparable private sector units were giving or what the profits generated by the subsidiary warranted." "The concept of holding company is good but if, in practice, it cannot function as an effective layer in planning, monitoring and control, it will be ineffective."
Another perspective of the holding company is as a way to relieve the bureaucracy's work load. Hard pressed government officials find it easy to process matters for one holding company than for several subsidiaries, especially when the matter involves a uniformly applicable principle. This view was expressed by one chief executive:
"We can realize the importance and utility of this holding company by simply imagining what would happen, if the 125 mills or their nine subsidiaries were to start approaching the ministry directly in the absence of a holding company. The ministry itself would have to become a holding company with consequences Vol. 13, No. 3, July-September 1988 11 one can easily imagine. I strongly believe that the holding company is performing a useful task. If it were to be abolished, as some of the chief executives of our subsidiaries sometimes urge, for the importance they imagine it will give them of dealing with the king, the government will soon have to reestablish it. And for the subsidiaries, who have now a buffer, it will be from the 'frying pan into the fire.' (Ajit Singh, 1988) ."
The same view was expressed by a Secretary in administrative charge of several enterprises:
"We also find it easier to deal with two people instead of 13."
Coal India Ltd.
Coal India Ltd. (GIL) came into being in 1975 holding five subsidiaries-four regional colliery companies and the Mine Planning Institute. Between 1975 and 1977 , the Chairman of GIL was also the chairman of all the five subsidiaries. In 1977, this practice was discontinued and the subsidiary chairmen were given wider powers.
CIL has been putting together statistics, widely regarded as of poor reliability, and has been proposing long-term plans to government. But as regards its role as a holding company, it has, however, been ineffective. Here is how its former chief executive summed up the experience:
"CIL never got off to work as a holding company. Its staff expertise and organization were weak initially. At the time of the first Chairman, the Secretary in the ministry had industry experience and was a qualified mining engineer while the Chairman of CIL was not. The Secretary knew the people who headed the subsidiaries and the problems they faced. He was active and dealt with the heads of subsidiaries directly. The Chairman of CIL felt bypassed. Also, the subsidiaries were required, as per government practices, to discuss their investment and output plans with the Planning Commission directly. The holding company representatives on the boards of the subsidiaries were junior to those of the subsidiary company on the board. As a result, CIL's role was restricted to what it could achieve with advice and personal influence. That capability keeps changing as people change." Did the government really want CIL to be a holding company? A senior executive of CIL expressed his frustration that the functional directors of the holding company and their positions on the subsidiary boards remained vacant for more than a year while the government directors were firmly in place.
Facilitator and Supplanting Styles
Our analysis of the Indian experience shows that the concept of holding company is not well understood. Because of this, in none of the five cases described above was there an attempt to specify the owners' interests or the way costs of the owner's political objectives, such as overstaffing, were to be met. The holding companies became a part of the governmental annual budgetary process. Further, the establishment of holding companies effected no change in the government's direct control over the subsidiaries through its various departments and inter-ministerial committees. Consequently, none of the holding companies could buffer the enterprises, except for SAIL between 1973 and 1976.
Practitioners have identified two styles of functioning of the holding company. One is that of a company which merely facilitates the functioning of the administrative ministry concerned. The other is the style that supplants the ministry's role in planning and control. SAIL, between 1973 and 1976 , worked as a supplanting style holding company, while all the other holding companies have been essentially of the facilitator type.
Styles and Performance
As a supplanting type holding company, SAIL achieved some success during Wadud Khan's tenure. But it is difficult to ascribe this success to holding company form. It resulted essentially from grafting a leadership over HSL which was a facilitator type holding company. SAIL's leadership itself was not clear of what role the holding company should play. Nor did it try to institutionalize the introduction of the industrial culture into the administrative ministry. It proceeded to take whatever steps it thought were necessary for increasing production. The political leadership supported it for a while. The success of SAIL may have more to do with this political support than to the structure of the company. For, similar is the situation today, under the leadership 12 Vikalpa of V Krishnamurthy, even though SAIL is no longer a holding company.
Similarly, NTC, a facilitator-type holding company, also achieved some success by exerting informal influence on the planning and control of the subsidiaries, especially between 1979 and 1982 when Moosa Raza was the Chairman. He took initiative especially in the areas of cotton and machinery purchase, marketing and training. NTC's exercise of constructive influence in these areas was primarily due to personal leadership. It did achieve results for NTC inasmuch as the losses during this period were relatively low.
However, these relationships have not continued. They have been subject to the government rules and procedures and its ad hoc control over appointments and other important decisions. The current chairman of NTC comments that the function of appointment of chairman and managing directors and functional directors of subsidiaries was "withdrawn from the holding company in 1983 and as part of a general policy decision ves ted in the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet... This I think was a serious blow to the effective functioning of the holding company and its ability to control the subsidiaries and in turn be accountable to government for their performance." (Ajit Singh, 1988) . Also inexplicable are the changes the government introduced in 1978 in the ministry-subsidiary relations in GIL.
Styles and Government Control
The facilitator-style holding company is flexible enough to let personal initiative or government control work, depending on the situation, for it does not fully insulate the enterprises against government interference. A holding company of this type takes advisory, data-gathering, planning and support roles leaving the government and the individual subsidiary to deal with each other directly on appointments, investments, budgets, and wage policies.
Even the supplanting type holding company's planning and control functions were subordinated to the administrative practices of the government. SAIL could recommend but not decide. Changes in the pricing policy had to go to the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs for clearance. Even individual prices needed inter-ministerial coordination. The government departments concerned did not insist on strict and a priori application of controls when Wadud Khan was known to have the support of the political power at the top. This kind of bureaucratic adjustment has taken place whenever the manager heading a holding company, a divisionalized company, or a subsidiary was known to be powerful.
Thus, neither the facilitator, nor the supplanting type of holding company was an effective buffer in the sense of enabling its subsidiaries to operate as autonomous businesses. The holding companies were also unable to "reduce the points of intervention by the government in the management of the enterprise," as anticipated by the Arjun Sengupta Committee.
A former secretary, who was also chief executive of large public enterprises, put it as follows: "In our set-up, it is the personality that matters. A person like V Krishnamurthy can get around the rules and procedures. A large multi-unit company like SAIL needs people with stature. Otherwise, it becomes weak in our present system of control." "Large multi-unit companies are doing better the world over. For example, they can recruit and transfer construction personnel or other special resources from one unit to the other. In our set-up, the construction people of a singleunit company become operating staff of that unit, and become burdensome. And the pressure on government to break up multi-project companies into single-project single-unit companies is high." Our analysis shows that holding companies have had short and limited periods of success. The periods of good performance or effective buffers have occurred when individual chief executives with personal power or leadership influence have been strong enough to stand for the owners' interests and temporarily insulate operating units from a priori or detailed governmental control. But such periods have been shortlived. During other periods, holding companies have functioned as a layer of bureaucracy facilitating the governmental methods of planning and control of subsidiaries.
The official committees that have recommended the holding company form appear to have been influenced more by the trend in the private sector, the successful practices in the European public sector, and the potential of an effective holding company than by the Indian experience or Vol. 13, No. 3, July-September 1988 actual problems in administration. If the holding company form has to be successful, it will have to be invested with proper integrative planning and control responsibilities derived from the owner's interests on the one hand and those of the operating units on the other.
What Needs to be Done
It is necessary, therefore, to examine the suggestion on the public enterprise holding form in the light of the prerequisites for its effectiveness. The first prerequisite is the structuring of political control as the IRI experience shows.
Another area that requires consideration is government's accountability to Parliament, which is a major argument for government interference into the operations of the subsidiaries. The system of accountability should make a distinction between the holding company and its subsidiary companies. The Sengupta Committee suggested that the responsibility to Parliament should be entirely of the minister and the head of the holding company, leaving the ministry out. This suggestion is worth considering in conjunction with the recommendations on the form of organization.
Other suggestions worth considering are:
• holding company should be given substantial powers with respect to mobilization, allocation and transfer of resources (men, money and material) among its subsidiaries • there should be two levels of leadership in the holding company-one that is accountable to the government and Parliament and appointed by them, and the other that is appointed by the holding company-continuing and career-based. Government control on appointments and a priori investment scrutiny must be restricted to the top management level of the holding company only • government should act as a single point contact for the first level holding company. Policy and performance should be reviewed only at the consolidated level, without requiring approvals and procedures to be followed with respect to each subsidiary • parliamentary accountability should be restricted to periodic investigation by the committee on Public Undertakings. The Minister and Chairman of holding company should refuse to debate questions pertaining to day-to-day operations of the subsidiaries.
An analysis of the functioning of IRI of Italy (Box 2) shows that many of the above mentioned prerequisities are fulfilled in its case. Only when the political level reposes trust in the managers of the holding company will they in turn be able to do the same vis-a-vis the subsidiaries. Competent professionals cannot be empowered and enabled to learn and perform without secure institutions. A well functioning multi-unit, multi-level hierarchy can gain competitive edge for a nation but can also become a big economic liability if managed centrally, through detailed procedures for planning and control, that are occasionally waived when confronted by political power or personal influence. A better structure for political control is necessary before a holding company can be an effective buffer for government enterprise.
